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Abstract
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in state legislation likely to reduce
access for some voters, including photo identification and proof of citizenship
requirements, registration restrictions, absentee ballot voting restrictions, and reductions
in early voting. Political operatives often ascribe malicious motives when their opponents
either endorse or oppose such legislation. In an effort to bring empirical clarity and
epistemological standards to what has been a deeply charged, partisan and frequently
anecdotal debate, this paper uses multiple specialized regression approaches to examine
factors associated with both the proposal and adoption of restrictive voter access
legislation from 2006-11. Our results indicate that proposal and passage are highly
partisan, strategic, and racialized affairs. These findings are consistent with a scenario in
which the targeted demobilization of minority voters and African Americans is a central
driver of recent legislative developments. We discuss the implications of these results for
current partisan and legal debates regarding voter restrictions and our understanding of the
conditions incentivizing modern suppression efforts. Further, we situate these policies
within developments in social welfare and criminal justice policy that collectively reduce
electoral access among the socially marginalized.
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In The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States
Alexander Keyssar notes that: “History rarely moves in simple, straight lines, and the
history of suffrage is no exception.”i The trajectory of voting rights and electoral access in
the U.S. is rightly seen as a story of the progressive extension of the franchise. However,
often obscured by such broad narratives is the reality that electoral reforms have worked
to both expand and restrict the franchise for particular categories of voters over time.ii
Exclusionary reforms are nearly universally enacted for partisan advantage, a temptation
enabled by state responsibility for the administration and regulation of elections.iii The
struggle to shape access to the vote has intensified once again as the volume of legislation
impacting electoral access has increased in recent years. In this article we focus on the
increasing proposal and passage of state laws that place new restrictions on various
aspects of both the voter registration process and the opportunity to actually cast a ballot.
Required photo identification or proof of citizenship to vote, more stringently regulation
of groups or individuals who aim to register new voters, shortened early voting periods,
repeal of same-day voter registration, and increased restrictions on voting by felons
exemplify the different types of policies that have been proposed and adopted in various
states since the mid-2000siv. Figure 1 illustrates the rise in the volume of proposed
restrictive changes since 2006 and the dramatic increase in restrictive legislation that
actually passed in 2011. These policies stand in sharp contrast to trends in the late 1990s
and early 2000s where many states expanded voting by mail and early voting—usually
under the assumption that these policies would increase voter participation.v
[Figure 1 goes about here]
Figure 2 illustrates which states have been the most active in proposing restrictive
voter access policies. The geographic distribution of this activity is widespread and does
not concentrate overwhelmingly in battleground states or any particular region. And while
more restrictions were proposed in the South due to a couple of particularly active states,
Southern states vary significantly in their rates of proposal. In short, the regional
distribution of proposed bills makes clear that restrictive voter access legislation was
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proposed with frequency nationwide from 2006 to 2011, but provides us little insight into
why.
[Figure 2 goes about here]
Figure 3 presents the number of restrictive legislative changes that were actually passed
by state legislatures between 2006-11. Consistent with the policy processvi, restrictive
voter access policies are passed at rates far lower than they are proposed. And in contrast
to legislative proposals, the geographic distribution of passed legislation is more
suggestive of the conditions driving policy adoption in this arena. It is clearly the case that
legislation passed more frequently in the South and in battleground states like Ohio and
Florida.
Collectively, these figures show that the proposal of restrictive voter access
legislation occurred in nearly every state between 2006-11 and that at least one restrictive
change passed in half of all states. Policy diffusion at such a significant rate and reach is
significant given the complexities and peculiarities of state-level policy making.vii The
popular press has taken note of these activities surrounding restrictive voter access
policies, but the explanations provided for such developments rely nearly exclusively on
partisan accounts.viii In what follows, we provide a comprehensive analysis of these
legislative developments by examining the state-level partisan, electoral, demographic,
and racial factors most strongly associated with more frequent proposal and passage of
these voter restrictions within states. We draw upon both current political discourse and
social science research for explanations as to why states have been more likely to consider
and adopt these new restrictions and offer each to empirical test. With findings from
sound social science as our vehicle, our analysis moves well beyond the trading of
partisan barbs and allows us to demonstrate the deficiencies in these conventional takes
for understanding recent legislative developments.
Beyond the partisan debate, our research offers an enrichment of theoretical
conversations concerning the roles played by political parties in American democracy,
voter suppression, race and policymaking, and even the broader literature on
democratization. For example, the classical view that political parties enhance democratic
3

incorporation under tight election margins is not borne out by the recent history of US
politics. Rather, we argue that the Republican Party has engaged in strategic
demobilization efforts in response to changing demographics, shifting electoral fortunes,
and an internal rightward ideological drift among the party faithful. Far from historically
unique, we situate the most recent round of electoral reforms among other measures
trumpeted as protecting electoral legitimacy while intended to exclude the marginalized
for a particular political party’s advantage. In doing so, our research bolsters and adds
contemporary nuance to our understanding of the political conditions that incentivize
parties to engage in voter suppression.
Our finding that legislative developments in this policy area remain heavily shaped
by racial considerations is strongly resonant with the historical relationships between
race, voter restrictions and federalism often viewed as hallmarks of American political
development.ix Further, we suggest that useful conceptual links may be drawn between
contemporary voter restrictions and recent developments in criminal justice and social
welfare policy. In all three of these policy areas racial threat and myths are particularly
salient, and the character of state-level legislation is particularly responsive to the racial
composition of states. As modern poverty governance and criminal justice policies are
increasingly understood through an analytic frame that emphasizes discriminatory and
disempowering impactsx, we view restrictive voter access legislation as an additional
layer of barriers reducing electoral access for minority and lower income voters. While
we focus on voter restrictions below, we highlight a broader suite of exclusionary policy
developments occurring across multiple policy arenas that have produced significant, and
increasing, variation in state-level access to the vote.
Theoretical links to the larger democratization literature are also in play here.
Upon first blush, connections between our findings and this literature may seem a stretch
because of the stability of U.S. democracy and absence of authoritarian traditions or
contexts.xi The processes that result from contemporary democratic transitions certainly
differ in magnitude from those involved in recent changes to American electoral policies.
Nonetheless, we find it striking that our findings expose elements of American
electioneering reminiscent of how actors in competitive authoritarian regimes manipulate
election practices so that voters are drawn almost exclusively from their own
4

supporters.xii We thus compliment the work of Desmond King and colleagues by showing
how one advanced democracy, the U.S., is actually changing voting procedures in a
racialized and restraining fashion in the modern era – “de-democratization” along racial
lines.xiii That this is true for the American case reinforces the incompleteness of most
American narratives regarding citizenship and political development. Deeply racialized,
exclusionary ideologies and corresponding practices have always accompanied the more
readily acknowledged reality of liberal incorporation.xiv We find the exclusionary
American tradition well represented today,xv a tendency bolstered, yet again, by the
power and flexibility federalism grants to the states. Last, for advocates of electoral
reform the developments examined here provide a cautionary reminder of the seemingly
endless variation and creativity evidenced in efforts to repurposed electoral reforms and
institutions to exclude voters and shape electoral outcomes.
[Figure 3 goes about here]
Partisan and Academic Perspectives
Those on the political left and political right have not been reticent to proffer
accounts, or level accusations, for why restrictive voter access legislation has been
proposed and adopted. On the left these policies are typically vilified as thinly veiled
attempts by Republicans to depress turnout among constituencies deemed favorable to the
Democratic Party: minorities, new immigrants, the elderly, disabled, and young.xvi Ari
Berman summarizes this view well in reference to the 2012 presidential election:
Republican officials have launched an unprecedented, centrally coordinated
campaign to suppress the elements of the Democratic vote that elected Barack
Obama in 2008. Just as Dixiecrats once used poll taxes and literacy tests to bar
black Southerners from voting, a new crop of GOP governors and state legislators
has passed a series of seemingly disconnected measures that could prevent
millions of students, minorities, immigrants, ex-convicts and the elderly from
casting ballots.xvii
Left-leaning media echo this line of reasoning, as do prominent interest groups like the
American Association of Retired People (AARP) and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People.xviii Such perceptions are only reinforced by instances
such as that of a Pennsylvania Republican state house majority leader who infamously
stated that the passage of the state’s 2012 voter identification law would “allow Governor
Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania.”xix
5

The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional, Civil Rights and Human
Rights, led by Democrats, held hearings on restrictive legislation under the title “New
State Voting Laws: Barriers to the Ballot?”.xx The Congressional Black Caucus,
Congressional Hispanic Caucus, and Congressional Asian Pacific American
Caucus joined forces in federal testimony and activism against the voter access policies’
alleged discriminatory intent.xxi The Department of Justice under the Obama
Administration, citing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, worked to nullify or stay voter
access legislation in Florida, Texas, and South Carolina arguing that the legislation would
“deny or abridge…. the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group”.xxii It is clear that for Democrats, restrictive voter access
policies are viewed as purposive efforts by Republicans to depress turnout amongst their
core constituents.
Meanwhile, many Republican politicians and their allies assert that restrictive
voter access legislation is intended to prevent or curtail rampant electoral fraud so as to
preserve the legitimacy and integrity of the electoral process.xxiii Such discussions often
emphasize the possibilities or invitation for fraud in voting rolls that include deceased
individuals, “fraud friendly” registration laws like the Motor Voter Bill, and absentee
ballots as a “tool of choice” for those attempting voter fraud.xxiv Further, some accuse
Democrats of committing electoral high jinks with more frequency because their core
constituents are more likely to commit fraud due to their economic insecurity.xxv As Larry
Sabato and Glenn Simpson explain the right’s logic, “Republican base voters are middleclass and not easily induced to commit fraud, while ‘the pools of people who appear to be
available and more vulnerable to an invitation to participate in vote fraud tend to lean
Democratic… …a poor person has more incentive to sell his vote than an upper class
suburbanite’.”xxvi From this perspective, Democrats who oppose voter access regulations
are working to continue their unfair and fraudulent advantages at the ballot box at the
expense of democratic legitimacy. Kenneth Blackwell, former Attorney General of Ohio
and current Republican operative, conveyed this while speaking on voter identification
proposals:
What more than 30 states have tried to do is put in place a common-sense measure
of voter ID so that people are assured that voters are who they purport to be, and
6

voter IDs are commonplace in our culture. You need [an ID] for a driver’s license,
for boarding an airplane, receiving a passport, purchasing alcohol or checking out
a library book. So to use it to safeguard the integrity of the voting process at the
voting station is pretty noneventful. … We all know the horror stories of ACORN
in 2008 and 2010. So there is enough evidence to suggest that we need to put
things in place to protect this from going crazy. This is a reasonable safeguard to
protect against voter fraud and ballot box stuffing when we have sufficient enough
evidence that there are some people who would do just that if given the
opportunity.xxvii
Right-leaning prestige media and blogs add further heat to this line of argument by
pushing back on the ascription of racial motivations by many on the left. As the National
Review’s Dennis Prager penned in 2011, and Fund and von Spakovsky similarly
referenced in 2012, “it is hard to imagine a more demeaning statement about black
America than labeling demands that all voters show a photo ID anti-black”.
Rhetorically then partisans on both the right and left provide distinct explanations
for the recent increase in restrictive voter access legislation.xxviii1 On the right, they are a
necessary response to rampant electoral fraud perpetrated by Democrats and allied
organizations. On the left, restrictive access legislation is seen as a strategic attempt to
reduce turnout amongst Democratic-leaning voters. Thankfully, there is a large body of
academic research that allows us to operationalize and empirically examine both these
claims while situating current developments within the larger context of American
electioneering, extending the franchise, and voter suppression.
Many who view recent restrictive efforts as attempts at voter suppression often
draw parallels to the long history of suppression and demobilization of certain categories
of voters. Such connections are not difficult to make as voter suppression is viewed by
many researchers familiar with the history of American elections as a pervasive and
consistent feature of U.S. political practice and institutions.xxix Suppression and
demobilization tactics range from the legal to illegal, the local to the national, and have
been adapted consistently to accommodate new legal, demographic, and strategic realities
over the years. The wide range of tactics employed include: violence and intimidation,
misinformation and deceptive practices, voter “caging” and challenging voters, and
suppressive administration by partisan election officials.xxx In this context the types of
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restrictive changes to electoral access we examine here represent a softer, legal form of
voter suppression. In fact, some scholarsxxxi argue that in response to a changing legal
environment modern suppression efforts have increasingly taken the form of changes to
state election laws. That is, the legal regime that emerged following the passage of the 24th
Amendment and the Voting Rights Act has made it more difficult to engage in the blunter
forms of voter suppression utilized in the past. From this perspective, the recent policy
changes examined here are analogous to the restrictive laws and practices in the Jim Crow
era designed to achieve discriminatory impacts without violating the 15th Amendment.
Lorraine Minnite contends:
Today, vote-suppression strategies are pursued through subtle forms of
intimidation and obstruction that take on the mantle of law and order. The strategy
involves exaggerating the fraud threat to justify the complexity of the electoral
system, a complexity created and compounded by the layering of more and more
rules to deter fraud… …Administrative complexities justified as race-neutral
necessities for deterring voter fraud are also opportunities for administrative error
that have come to replace opportunities for vote suppression by other means. This
is the context for the proliferation of unsupported fraud allegations today. The
allegations shrewdly veil a political strategy for winning elections by tamping
down turnout amongst socially subordinate groups. It is the most vulnerable
voters, those with the least education or the least experience in operating the
machinery of the electoral process, that are the most in need of the simplest rules
and the easiest access. Thus, it is these voters who stand in for the criminal voters
conjured up by the spurious voter fraud allegations and imagined by the U.S.
cultural myth of voter fraud.xxxii
In the modern era, frontal attack on the right to vote is not politically acceptable, but
targeting voter registration and access policies under the auspicious of “ballot security”
continues to be quite viable.xxxiii
This academic work outlines the conditions under which parties are more likely to
engage in suppression and demobilization. Francis Fox Piven and colleagues remind us of
the simple reality that: "election contests can be won by bringing more voters to the polls
or by deterring the voters who support the opposition from casting their ballots. In other
words, by voter mobilization or by voter suppression”.xxxiv Consequently, a principal
expectation is that political parties may mobilize or demobilize as is electorally
efficacious.xxxv This perspective contrasts with a classical view that suggests that
competition drives political parties to mobilize new constituencies in pursuit of untapped
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resources that may shape electoral outcomes.xxxvi Due to their comparatively low turnout
rates overtime, the poor, African Americans, ethnic minorities, and immigrants are argued
to become particularly attractive for mobilization. The demobilization view counters by
highlighting the historical tensions between the legal expansion of the franchise for these
groups and the actual practices surrounding its access.xxxvii Further, political parties are
argued to have heightened incentives, under certain condition, to engage in the
suppression of their opponents’ supporters. Suppression becomes especially attractive
when rallying new voters to one’s own party is viewed as costly, unpredictable, or
potentially disruptive to the base.xxxviii In particular, appeals and policy positions crafted to
appeal to lower income voters may conflict with political precedents and the interests of
more well heeled supporters.xxxix Given such constraints suppressing the competition is
incentivized, particularly when election margins are tight.xl
The take-away is that in a two-party system both parties have faced incentives to
selectively suppress the vote and both have done so. In the 19th century and the first half
of the 20th century, the Democratic Party engaged in multiple interlocking layers of
suppression efforts to disenfranchise African Americans in the South, while in the North
Republicans, albeit to a much lesser extent, made efforts to suppress Democratic-leaning
low-income and immigrant voters.xli Since the 1960s, however, political conditions have
aligned in a manner intensifying these incentives for the Republican Party. The civil rights
movement and the Voting Rights Act transformed the racial character of party affiliation
such that African-American voters came to overwhelming support Democratic candidates.
Being perceived as African American then became a reliable marker for partisan
preferences and an efficient guide for targeting suppression efforts. Lower income voters,
of any race, have been similarly targeted as they disproportionately vote Democratic.xlii In
response to a changing electoral environment, the GOP has become the central driver of
restrictive changes to election laws and the primary perpetrators of a wide range of
suppression efforts.xliii In short, this literature is explicit about which political party is
more likely to engage in suppression in the current era; the groups likely to be targeted by
such efforts; and the likelihood that voter demobilization will be “accomplished by legal
and administrative subterfuge, with justifications that proclaim the rules and practices to
be essential in safeguarding American democracy”.xliv
9

An Empirical Approach
These partisan and academic accounts ascribe vastly different motivations for the
recent rise in the proposal and passage of restrictive legislation. The following analyses
offer a unique empirical perspective in which we systematically examine which political,
electoral, and contextual factors are associated with whether states proposed or passed
restrictive voter access policies between 2006 and 2011.xlv Ours is not a treatment then
that weighs in empirically on what the effect of passing and implementing such legislation
has been or will be. Rather, we identify a constellation of conditions that may shape the
policy making process in this area and subject them to empirical test. Restrictive
legislation may be a response to strategic political calculationxlvi , rational determination of
a problemxlvii , evidence of symbolic politics and fearxlviii, interplay between the structural,
partisan, and cultural confines of policymakingxlix, or all of the above. These forces may
be differentially relevant depending on whether proposal or passage is under examination.
Passing legislation, for example, is more constrained by the specific political context
within state legislatures than is a lawmaker’s ability to propose legislation. Bills that are
proposed, but are likely or expected to fail, may be motivated by a genuine effort by
policymakers to achieve legislative change or by an interest in engaging in symbolic
politics. Considering both provides multiple angles from which to build inferences as to
what has motivated the pursuit of restrictive voter access policies. In doing so, we make a
contemporary, empirical contribution to the larger body of work examining the conditions
and historical moments in which parties engage in voter suppression efforts, and press the
normatively important question of what role political parties play in securing access to the
ballot. Further, we provide empirical footing for evaluating partisan claims regarding the
motives driving contemporary restrictive access legislation. Today’s widespread
accusatory rhetoric is long on dramatic flair but short on evidence. This paper fills this
much-needed evidentiary gap.
Independent and Control Variables
Popular discourse, research on voter suppression, and general research on the
policymaking process suggest a wide range of state-level factors that may increase or
10

decrease the likelihood that states adopt or consider restrictive voter access legislation.
Below we identify the primary variables included in our analyses. Data sources and details
of operationalization for all variables are available in Appendix A.
This first set of variables center around partisan control and electoral competition.
It is widely acknowledged that in modern era electoral politics, “vote fraud is traditionally
the type of election irregularity that Republicans focus on, while vote theft is often cited
by Democrats”.l Further, empirical research consistently suggests that restrictive
legislation of the kind considered here will disproportionately deplete turnout among
potential low-income voters and minorities, two groups that skew heavily towards the
Democratic Party.li Given this, and the fact that party lines are influential in determining
policy outcomeslii, we expect restrictive voter access policies will be considered and
passed more often where Republican officials exercise more control. To examine the
influence of Republican party control we include multiple factors that should capture the
relative ease or difficulty Republicans have in getting their policy proposals adopted:
Republican legislative strength, the presence of a Republican Governor, and whether or
not the state has a divided government.
As discussed above, the voter suppression literature suggests that parties have
more incentive to engage in suppression in the context of tight elections. We expect the
difference in the party vote share in the previous presidential election to impact the
likelihood of a state to propose and pass restrictive voter access legislation. If a state has a
smaller value on this measure, meaning the state was more competitive in the Electoral
College, the potential pay off for suppression efforts increases dramatically. However, the
incentives for suppression are not symmetrical for the two major parties. In the context of
highly competitive elections, Democratic legislators are presumably less inclined to
pursue or enact changes that are likely to depress turnout among their own supporters.
This suggests that the impact of competitiveness may be conditional, a possibility we
explore below with interaction effects.
We also examine the role of local interparty competition understanding that state
legislators may be motivated more by local partisan concerns rather than national electoral
outcomes. State legislators in chambers closely divided along party lines may seek the
passage of such legislation in the hopes of advantaging their own party. However, we also
11

expect it may be more difficult to pass such controversial legislation in the context of
smaller majorities. The variable is a simplified version of the Ranney indexliii so that
higher values indicate more competitive scenarios (more evenly divided parties in each
house) and total party control (100% of seats) would produce a value of 0.liv
Registering to vote, maintaining registration after a move, and the logistics
involved in actually casting a ballot are more cumbersome in the United States than other
advanced democracies.lv It is well known that these hurdles are more burdensome for
those of lower socio-economic status, individuals of color, new citizens, and the elderly.lvi
For those concerned about voter suppression, recent legislative developments introducing
new requirements are but the modern continuation of purposeful efforts to selectively
suppress the vote via procedural means.lvii If this is the case, all else being equal, we
should see restrictive voter access legislation considered and adopted in states where
historically vulnerable Democratic constituencies turnout at higher rates, have increased
their levels of turnout in recent elections, or both.
We examine whether states with higher rates of minority turnout, and those that
saw increases in minority turnout between the 2000 and 2004 and the 2004 and 2008
Presidential elections experienced an increase in the frequency of proposal or passage of
restrictive legislation.lviii Similarly, if legislators are sensitive to the level of turnout among
the less affluent in ways consistent with targeted voter suppression, states where lowincome individuals turnout at rates that more closely approximate that of wealthier voters
should see restrictive voter legislation proposed and passed with increased frequency. This
is especially apt as levels of upper class turnout bias have decreased between the
Presidential election years examined here. Our variable replicates James Avery and Mark
Peffley’slix ratio of affluent voter turnout (over 75K) to that of lower income (under federal
poverty line) for years 2000, 2004, and 2008 respectively. Larger values mean greater
upper-class bias. The class bias change variable is the difference in the turnout ratio
between the previous two Presidential elections. Positive values on this measure indicate
that class bias has decreased.
We also explore the possibility that restrictive legislative activity may be a
response to overall turnout. Gains in voter turnout at the federal level are usually drawn
disproportionately from lower-income individuals who are disproportionately people of
12

color.lx Aggregate gains in turnout are often read as increases among constituencies
favorable to Democrats. Reliable and valid real-time voting/polling data for all 50 states is
notoriously difficult to gather, let alone data on specific subgroups of voters.
Consequently, political professionals and elected officials who aim to strategically deplete
turnout amongst Democratic constituencies may reasonably rely on aggregate turnout as a
proxy for electoral shifts unfavorable to them. To explore this we include a measure of
overall turnout in the previous Presidential election.
Proposing and passing restrictive voter access legislation in response to minority
and lower-income electoral participation is a retrospective response—one that may
involve initial electoral setbacks. Strategic politicians may then support restrictive
policies prior to election season relying on purely demographic indicators deemed
troubling for their re-election or party. We test for this motivation behind restrictive voter
access legislation with the inclusion of the percentage of African-Americans, noncitizens, and the elderly within states. The logic is simple in each case. Of all racial and
ethnic groups, the battle for the franchise is most interwoven with the African American
experience in the U.S.. Historically, the larger the percentage of African Americans in a
state the more difficult it is for African Americans to realize the right to vote.lxi If the
proposal or passage of restrictive legislation is associated with state racial composition,
this is supportive of a voter suppression narrative. The same pattern may hold for states
with larger numbers of non-citizen residents. Many in this population will eventually
acquire citizenship and new immigrants are more likely to vote Democratic – especially
given the increasingly harsh immigration rhetoric in the Grand Old Party.lxii Last, if
targeted demobilization drives restrictive legislation the opposite expectation holds for
the percentage of elderly in a state. The elderly go to the polls at higher rates than other
age groups and, increasingly since the 2008 election, disproportionately support
Republican candidates.lxiii As many of the restrictive policies examined here may also
suppress participation by elderly voters, we expect these policies may be pursued with
less vigor in states with larger proportions of elderly residents.
Republicans typically contend that voter IDs, proof of citizenship to vote, and
similar policies are necessary to curtail election fraud in the wake of reforms that have
made it easier to vote.lxiv Examples cited as representative and uncontested include
13

phantom voters registered under “Motor Voter Laws”, non-citizen voting, and the
disenfranchisement of military voters. In addition, myths abound alleging massive voter
fraud in Florida during the 2000 election and similar accusations involving ACORN in
more recent elections.lxv A historical perspective certainly provides colorful examples of
fraudulent electoral activities.lxvi Today, however, the largely uncontested conclusion
within social science circles is that deliberate, systematic electoral fraud is extremely
infrequent.lxvii Nonetheless, reports of actual voter fraud may predict the consideration
and adoption of restrictive voter access policies. Our measure of fraud comes from the
American Center for Voting Rightslxviii and Lorraine Minnite’slxix exhaustive accounting
of all fraud allegations in the 2004 election cycle.
Interest group mobilization is also central to understanding agenda setting and
policy outcomes. The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is one such
interest group uniquely active in creating and disseminating model voter identification
legislation. This organization coordinates task forces charged with drafting model
legislation, and such legislation for voter identification provisions has been promoted by
ALEC.lxx Given the purported influence of ALEC, and its work at the state level, we
expect that state delegations who have higher percentages of ALEC-affiliated members
may be more likely to pass restrictive voter access legislation.lxxi
Our third attempt to tap into perceptions of electoral fraud is a measure of political
culture among a state’s citizens. If liberals see fraud as infrequent and diversionary, and
conservatives view fraud as frequent and threatening to democracy, then it follows that
states with more liberal political cultures should be less interested in considering and
adopting restrictive voter access legislation. We use updates of William Berry, Evan
Ringquist, Richard Fording, and Russell Hanson’slxxii measure of citizen ideology to
empirically characterize this dimension of state political culture.
We also examine the contribution of policy diffusion. Simply put, states tend to
adopt the policies that their neighboring states do.lxxiii The processes by which this occurs
remains contested but there is little doubt that policy diffusion happens between U.S.
states and that it occurs with neighboring states most frequently. Consequently, states may
be more likely to consider and adopt restrictive voter access legislation as surrounding
states do so.
14

Last, all of our analyses below contain a number of control variables. First, if a
state has already passed a photo identification or proof of citizenship requirement then
we would expect there to be less proposal and certainly less passage of such legislation.
Second, we control for whether a state currently makes available either early or no-excuse
absentee voting or both. If voter suppression motivates the proposal and passage of voter
access legislation, we expect states with more accessible election practices may be more
likely to pass restrictive legislation. Finally, states with fewer economic resources may be
less likely to create new regulations, restrictions, or procedures, as such innovations may
be perceived as too costly.lxxiv This factor is included in the form of real state revenue per
capita.
Measuring Restrictive Voter Legislation
Our dependent variables take the form of the annual count of restrictive changes to
voter access proposed or passed within state legislatures between 2006 and 2011.lxxv As
noted, we focus on five different types of legislation: photo identification requirements,
proof of citizenship requirements, laws which introduce restrictions on voter registration,
restrictions on absentee and early voting, and restrictions on participation by felons. Table
1 provides a breakdown of which states have passed these different types of laws and in
which year. For the years 2006-2010 these data are drawn from the National Conference
of State Legislatures’ Database of Election Reform Legislation.lxxvi For 2011, we draw
upon an exhaustive report from the Brennan Center for Justice, Voting Law Changes in
2012, which details legislative developments in these categories of laws in 2011.lxxvii
[Insert Table 1 here]
The passed legislation in Table 1 all have the potential to reduce voter access at
various points in the registration and voting process. Perhaps most well known are new
laws requiring photo identification to cast a ballot and proof of citizenship in order to
register to vote. The category of registration restrictions includes policies that impact both
voters directly and third party organizations involved in registering voters. The former
include reductions in the window for registration, such as eliminating Election Day
registration, or increasing state residency requirements. Restrictions on voter registration
drives vary, but most commonly involve: requiring registration groups to register with the
15

state, mandatory training for anyone registering voters, special disclosure procedures, and
short deadlines for the submission of voter registration forms. Failure to comply is often
paired with newly established fines or criminal penalties. Restrictions on absentee voting
include reducing the time during which absentee ballots can be applied for or accepted
and restrictions preventing civic or political organizations from delivering absentee
ballots. Last, early voting restrictions primarily involve reducing the number of days or
hours during which early voting is available.
In addition, we examine proposed legislation that would restrict voter access. This
includes all proposed legislation along the lines described above, but also legislation that
increase requirements or restrictions on either registration or the voting process relative to
existing state law. For example, in a state with no voter identification requirements a bill
to introduce identification requirements, even if these requirements do not require a
photograph, is considered a restrictive proposal.lxxviii Similarly, bills to increase the
requirements for registration or the receipt of absentee ballots are considered restrictive.
Last, while no state passed new legislation related to the voting rights of felons in the
period under examination, it was proposed in many states.lxxix Most common was
legislation banning felons (or those convicted of particular categories of felony offenses)
from voting for life. Other such bills included increasing the criminal penalty for
registering to vote if one is an ineligible felon, extending a felon’s period of ineligibility to
include parole or probation if state laws does not already prevent this, or requiring that all
fines imposed by sentence and court costs must be paid before the restoration of voting
rights.
Determinants of Proposal and Passage
In our analyses, we use specialized regression techniques that allow assessments of
the relative strength and significance of each explanation for passing and proposing
restrictive access legislation between 2006 and 2011 while controlling for other
independent variables. These approaches follow the logic of classic multiple regression
while accommodating the particular structure of, and specific issues within, our data.lxxx
Below we briefly introduce the reasons for selecting each modeling approach before
discussing the results of each set of models. All models were run using Stata version 11.2.
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Proposed Legislation: GMM Analyses
First, we examine which state-level factors are associated with a higher annual count
of proposed restrictive voter access legislation between 2006 and 2011. The cross
sectional nature of our dataset and the fact that the dependent variable is a count (the
number of restrictive legislative changes proposed in a state each year) would lead
normally to the use of a pooled Poisson modeling approach. Unfortunately, one of our
central variables of interest violates an assumption required for the use of a pooled
Poisson approach. The “percentage of the state legislature Republican” variable is related
to the error term in the model which can bias estimates.lxxxi This problem, referred to as
endogeneity, requires that accommodations be made in order to address the presence of
such endogenous variables.lxxxii We use a generalized methods of moments (GMM)
modeling approach because it allows one to directly address the presence of endogenous
variables through the use of instrumental variables.lxxxiii An instrument variable, a variable
that stands in for an endogenous factor, must be correlated with the variable they are
replacing but not with the error term. Three variables in our analyses meet these criteria:
our ALEC variable, the Republican Governor variable, and the citizen ideology measure.
For the following GMM analyses, these three variables are included in place of the
problematic percentage of the state legislature Republican variable.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 2 contains the results of 4 GMM models examining the state-level factors
associated with higher annual counts of proposed voter restriction legislation.lxxxiv Models
1 & 2 examine the factors associated with the proposal of all types of restrictive legislative
changes identified above and these two models differ in only respect. The measures of
minority turnout in the previous presidential election and state % African American are
highly correlated and either variable is highly significant in the absence of the other.
Models 1 & 2 introduce each of these variables individually. Both larger proportions of
African American residents and higher levels of minority turnout in the previous
presidential election are significantly associated with more proposed legislation. While
such results make it difficult to adjudicate precisely between the contributions of these
correlated but distinct factors, it is clear that the racial composition of a state is strongly
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related to the proposal of changes which would restrict voter access. The minority turnout
variable suggests that concern about the electoral consequences of minority, and
especially African-American, turnout is a primary driver of the broader effect of state
racial composition. Reinforcing this interpretation is that fact that in both Models 1 & 2
larger increases in minority turnout between the previous two presidential elections are
associated with greater frequency of proposed legislation. All of this is consistent with
minority voter suppression and electoral considerations being central motives for the
proposal of voter restrictions.
Only two additional factors are found to increase the proposal of restrictive
legislation. First, larger increases in class-biased turnout, indicating higher turnout among
lower income voters relative to wealthy voters, is significantly associated with a larger
volume of proposed legislative changes. Low-income individuals vote less frequently
than the affluent in every state but where this gap has been closing in recent years,
restrictive access legislation is more apt to be proposed. Second, states with larger
proportions of non-citizens also saw restrictive legislation proposed more frequently. In
sum, where African-Americans and poor people vote more frequently, and there are
larger numbers of non-citizens, restrictive access legislation is more likely to be proposed.
It is noteworthy that within Models 1 & 2 none of our measures of partisan control
or electoral competition are significant. In particular, a larger proportion of Republicans in
the state legislature is not associated with a higher frequency of proposed bills. This could
be due to multiple factors. A legislator does not need to be in the majority party to propose
legislation. Further, multiple bills that have little chance of passing may be proposed by
Republicans in the minority for partisan or symbolic reasons. For example, a number of
(disproportionately Republican) legislators in Massachusetts have introduced dozens of
restrictive bills, none of which have passed during this period. On the other hand, a
legislature that is dominated by Republicans may be able to pass a larger proportion of a
smaller number of proposed bills. Further, it is possible that Republican legislators in
solidly Republican states may have less electoral incentive to pursue such restrictive
legislation at all. All of these considerations may complicate a simple linear relationship
between the percentage of Republican legislators and the proposal of restrictive
legislation.
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In order to explore whether the forces driving the proposal of identification and
proof of citizenship requirements differs from the proposal of registration, absentee, and
early voting restrictions, Models 3 and 4 examine the count of these proposed legislative
changes separately. The factors associated with more frequent proposal of these different
types of restrictions are largely the same, appearing to be primarily a response to either
levels of or change in minority turnout, levels or change in class-biased turnout, and the
proportion of non-citizens.
From all this a striking story emerges: the proposal of restrictive voter access
legislation has been substantially more likely to occur where African-Americans are
concentrated and both minorities and low-income individuals have begun turning out at
the polls more frequently. Given that we are examining the years 2006-11, we can
specifically attribute these developments to the significant increases in voter turnout
among these groups in the 2008 election. States where these developments were felt more
intensely were correspondingly more likely to propose legislation. While we can only
infer motivation, these results strongly suggest that the proposal of these policies has been
driven by electoral concerns differentially attuned to demobilizing African-American and
lower-income Americans. Such patterns of association are strongly consistent with the
expectations derived from the literature on voter suppression.
Passed Legislation: Pooled Poisson Analyses
In this second set of analyses we turn our attention to the actual passage of legislative
changes that reduce voter access. As in our analysis of proposed legislation, a pooled
Poisson approach is appropriate, but we again have a problem with the presence of
endogenous variables. However, in this case it is not possible to use the GMM estimation
technique for these analyses primarily because the new outcome of interest, passed
legislation, occurs too infrequently. A fixed effects modeling approach is a commonly
used technique to address this specific issue, the presence of endogenous factors, but this
approach is not without some costs. Fixed effects approaches only utilize within-group, in
our case within-state, variation over time. This significantly impacts both the cases
involved in the analyses and the interpretation of the results. First, only cases that exhibit
variation on the dependent variable and only variables that exhibit variation over time can
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be included in such analyses. Consequently, only states that actually passed a piece of
legislation during our 2006-2011 time period are included, resulting in a total of 150 stateyear observations. Time-invariant variables, citizen ideology and voter fraud cases, are
unavoidably dropped from all models. Second, it is important to stress that these analyses
reveal only the within state developments associated with the increased likelihood of
passage of legislation.lxxxv
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 3 contains the results of 2 pooled-Poisson fixed effects models examining
state level factors associated with the annual count of restrictive changes to voter access
passed in each state. Beginning with the impact of the balance of partisan power within
state governments, the proportion of the legislature Republican, the presence of a
Republican Governor, and the degree of competitiveness between the parties within state
legislatures are all significantly associated with the passage of restrictive changes. In the
context of a fixed-effects framework, these results indicate that within states over time a
larger proportion of Republicans in the legislature and the presence of a Republican
Governor are associated with a higher annual count of passed legislation. These effects are
most likely driven by the substantial increase in restrictive changes passed following the
Republican “wave” election of 2010 where the GOP picked up 11 governorships and
gained control of 57 state legislative chambers (up from 36 in 2009). Of the 41 adopted
voter restrictions considered here, 34 restrictive changes (83%) passed in Republican
controlled state legislatures. Further, of the bills requiring either photo ID or proof of
citizenship (the policies that are the most unambiguously expected to disproportionately
burden likely Democratic voters), all were passed in legislatures under Republican control
(see Table 1). Given that the reductions in voter participation and access potentially
resulting from these policies would overwhelmingly benefit Republicans, we are not
surprised to see such a strong influence of party control on passage. The effect of the
simplified Ranney index is negative indicating that states where the partisan balance of
power has become more evenly divided are less likely to pass restrictive legislation. This
likely reflects the reality that passing controversial legislation with obvious partisan
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consequences is more difficult to accomplish in the context of more closely divided
legislatures.
Our second measure of electoral competition captures a state’s degree of
competitiveness in national political contests: the difference in the party vote share in the
previous presidential election. This variable is insignificant in Model 1. However in
Model 2 it becomes significant upon the inclusion of an interaction effect testing whether
the effect of a state’s competitiveness on the passage of restrictive legislation depends
upon the degree of party control exercised by state Republicans. This significant
interaction effect indicates that increases in competitiveness within presidential contests
translates into more restrictive changes in states with larger Republican majorities and
fewer restrictive laws in states with larger Democratic majorities. Considerations of
national electoral outcomes, especially the presidency, appear central to passing restrictive
changes – especially in states where both the motivation and means converge.
After accounting for the variation in passage explained by party control and
electoral competition, only three additional factors emerge as significant in Model 2.
Consistent with our findings for proposed legislation, states where minority turnout has
increased since the previous presidential election were more likely to pass restrictive
legislation. Second, the variable capturing the proportion of the state population over 65
years old is negative and significant, indicating that states where the elderly population is
growing are less likely to pass restrictive changes. Last, these results suggest that states
where election accessibility has increased through the introduction of early or no-excuse
absentee voting were more likely to pass restrictive legislation. We do not want to
overemphasize this last finding though as the number of states who experienced such
increased accessibility during this time period is extremely small.
Passed Legislation: 2011 Poisson Analyses
As stated above, fixed effects approaches only make use of within state-variation,
but what of the effects of stable state characteristics that do not vary much within states
over time but do vary substantially between states? For example, a demographic factor
like the percentage of a state’s population that is African-American will not fluctuate
dramatically year-to-year, and we are not looking for an effect of such changes. Rather,
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we are primarily interested in whether states with larger numbers of African-American
residents are more likely to pass such legislation. In order to explore the impact of such
cross-state differences, our last set of models present the results of multiple (traditional)
Poisson regressions examining the determinants of the total count of restrictive changes to
voter access passed in 2011. In 2011 state legislatures passed 22 provisions restricting
voter access. The highest national count in the previous 5 years was 8 restrictive changes
passed in 2006. 2011 was a year of dramatically increased legislative activity in this issue
area and one that we suspect was influenced by a unique confluence of conditions and
pressures that are unique to the post-2008 (and pre-2012) election years.
[Table 4 goes about here]
Table 4 presents the results of 4 Poisson analyses examining state-level
determinants of the count of restrictive changes to voter access passed in 2011. Model 1
presents the results of a reduced model containing only our measures of partisan control. It
indicates that states with Republican governors were more likely to pass such legislation,
but the percent of the legislature Republican is insignificant and even bears a negative
sign. This indicates that simply holding a majority of seats does not guarantee that the
majority party can actually pass this controversial legislation. The presence of a
Democratic Governor’s veto will reduce the chance of a voter restriction bill becoming
law even if passed by a Republican controlled state legislature. Additionally, in the
context of divided government an opposition party, in this case usually the Democratic
Party, may check the passage of legislation even if that party holds a strong majority of
seats in one chamber. These combinations of conditions likely modify the direct effect of
the percentage of Republican legislators on the count of restrictions passed. To examine
this conjunctural effect more directly, we constructed a variable indicating the presence
and strength of an unencumbered Republican majority in the state legislature.lxxxvi This
variable simply takes the value of the percent of Republican legislators unless the
Republicans are in the minority, the state has a divided government, or a Democratic
governor. Under these conditions the variable takes a value of zero. Model 2-4 include
this new variable and the variables which comprise it are dropped from the models. This
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variable is both highly significant and is an extremely influential factor in these analyses
indicating that the presence and size of an unencumbered Republican majority are
positively associated with a larger volume of passed restrictive changes in 2011.
In these models we do not use the difference in party vote share variable in the
previous presidential election, our measure of the competitiveness of the state in
presidential elections used previously. Rather, we created a dummy variable for states
that were identified in journalism published in 2010 as potential swing states in the 2012
election. For this list we drew primarily on outlets specializing in political reporting (e.g.
Roll Call and POLITICO). Ten states were the most frequently discussed: Colorado,
Florida, Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and Wisconsin. Whether these states were actually considered highly competitive swing
states in the actual run-up to the 2012 election is not as important as the perception
among lawmakers in 2011 that their state could play a decisive role in the upcoming
presidential election. This potential swing state variable is insignificant in Model 3, but
becomes significant when interacted with the unencumbered Republican majority
variable in Model 4. The negative direct effect of being a potential swing state indicates
that it is more difficult on average to pass such restrictive changes in potential swing
states than in non-swing states, presumably due to heightened political consequences
making such changes more hard fought. The significant interaction effect captures the
fact that potential swing states with an unencumbered majority Republican were more
likely to pass restrictive changes in 2011. However, in the absence of an unencumbered
Republican majority potential swing states were significantly less likely to enact such
legislation. In other words, Democrats appear to have been extra vigilant in 2011 to
prevent the passage of such changes in potential swing states.
The second most influential individual factor in these analyses is a state’s racial
composition as captured by either the percentage of the state population that is African
American or minority turnout in the 2008 election. Both factors are associated with a
larger number of passed restrictive changes and are highly significant in the absence of
one another. Model 3 includes minority turnout in 2008 and omits the % African
American variable; Model 4 provides the converse. As was the case in both previous
analyses of proposed and passed changes, controlling for a wide range of factors states
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with larger proportions of minority voters and African American residents were more
likely to pass restrictive voter legislation in 2011.
In the remainder of this discussion we will focus on the results produced by Model
4, which takes into account both the highly influential impact of state racial composition
and the swing state interaction effect discussed above. A number of additional factors
emerge as significant. In contrast to our findings in the analyses of proposed changes, it
appears that states with larger increases in minority turnout between 2004 and 2008 are
less likely to pass restrictive changes in 2011. So states where minorities make up a larger
proportion of those casting a ballot are more likely to pass restrictive legislation, but if
that state experienced a surge in minority turnout in 2008 the likelihood of passage of such
legislation is reduced. This could be indicative of a different political calculus confronting
legislators in the context of states with larger shares of mobilized minority voters.
Specifically, the possibility of public anger, attention, or backlash might undermine, or
even reverse, any electoral benefits of actually passing restrictive legislation. Indeed,
numerous journalistic reports have suggested the passage of restrictive voter legislation in
a few states galvanized minorities and especially African American voters to participate in
the 2012 election.lxxxvii Concerns about such a backlash effect strikes us a plausible
explanation for the negative influence of increased minority turnout in 2008 on the
passage of restrictive legislation in 2011.
Second, it also appears that states with larger levels of overall turnout in 2008 were
less likely to pass restrictive legislation in 2011, but this is true only when controls for
state racial composition or minority turnout are in place. Once the fact that states with
more African-American voters and residents are more likely to pass restrictive legislation
is accounted for, this variable captures the corresponding reality that higher levels of white
turnout are associated with a reduced likelihood of the passage of such legislation. This
simply underlines the centrality of racial considerations to the passage of restrictive voter
legislation. Third, we find that states with larger proportions of elderly residents are less
likely to enact restrictive changes. We interpret this as potentially reflective of a strategic,
partisan recognition that restrictive policies likely to suppress lower-income and minority
voters may also impede participation by elderly, and Republican-leaning, voters as well.
Fourth, our measures characterizing the previous state of election accessibility indicate
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that states that have already passed a photo identification or proof of citizenship law
passed a smaller number of changes in 2011. On the other hand, states with highly
accessible elections, as indicated by the presence of both no-excuse absentee and early
voting, were more likely to pass restrictive changes in 2011. All of these findings are
consistent with a voter suppression narrative.
Lastly, the number of reported cases of voter fraud is significantly associated with
higher rates of passage of legislation in 2011. We are skeptical that this variable represents
any true measure of actual voter fraud and find it more reasonable to consider it an
indicator of selective, and in some cases explicitly partisan, efforts to raise concerns about
voter fraud. That said, some may read this as evidence that restrictive legislation has
passed, in part, in response to actual fraud. While it is not possible to adjudicate between
these two interpretations here, it is important to stress that in the big picture the impact of
this factor is minor compared to the influences of the partisan, electoral, and racial factors
identified in these analyses. Figure 4 attempts to provide exactly this, a sense of the
respective impacts of the central factors identified as significant in these analyses. It
displays the change in the predicted count of restrictive provisions passed in 2011 given a
one standard deviation increase in each factor while holding all other variables at their
mean values. For example, a hypothetical state with a proportion of African American
residents one standard deviation above the mean and average values on all other variables
would be expected to pass over 2.5 more restrictive provisions in 2011 than a state with
average values on all variables (including % African American). As this figure makes
clear, partisan control and state racial composition are overwhelmingly the two most
influential factors associated with the passage of restrictive legislation in this year.
[Figure 4 goes about here]
In sum, these findings suggest that over the 2006-2011 period states that increased
their share of Republican legislators, elected a Republican Governor, or became more
competitive in the electoral college in the presence of a Republican majority in the state
house were more likely to pass restrictive voter legislation. States experiencing increasing
minority turnout were also more likely to pass restrictive legislation. Focusing on
legislation passed in 2011, we find that more restrictive changes passed in states with
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unencumbered Republican majorities, larger proportions of minority voters or African
American residents, more reported cases of voter fraud, and more accessible election
systems.
Voter Restrictions as Strategic Voter Suppression
Zooming out, a straightforward picture emerges. Our analyses identify a very
substantial and significant association between the racial composition of a state’s
residents or active electorate and both the proposal and passage of voter restriction
legislation. This association is robust across multiple modeling approaches and
controlling for a wide variety of relevant factors. Further, these findings demonstrate that
the emergence and passage of restrictive voter access legislation is unambiguously a
highly partisan affair, influenced by the intensity of electoral competition. The fact that in
the context of heightened competition Republican control increases, while Democratic
control reduces, the rate of restrictions passed underlines the highly strategic nature of
these efforts. It also appears that demobilization efforts are not a blunt practice. Passing
restrictive voter legislation (in noteworthy contrast to proposal) is shaped by an apparent
sensitivity to the net impact of restrictive policies. That is, the electoral benefits of
reforms with disproportionate suppression effects appear to be weighed against the risks
of galvanizing turnout among groups targeted for demobilization or accidentally
suppressing supporters. In combination, these findings are strongly consistent with a
scenario in which minority voter suppression is a central driver of recent legislative
developments restricting voter access.lxxxviii Indeed, we find that the best available
measure of actual voter fraud is not associated with the proposal of legislation and is only
a minor contributing factor to the passage of restrictive changes in 2011. This is not a
particularly surprising finding as serious empirical attempts to quantify the extent of voter
fraud have consistently found such fraud to be exceedingly rare in modern U.S.
elections.lxxxix These findings are relevant to current partisan and legal debates regarding
voter restrictions, our understanding of the conditions that incentivize suppression efforts,
and broader developments across multiple policy arenas that have reduced electoral
access among the socially marginalized.
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The 2012 Election and Beyond
A typical cable news night surrounding election 2012 featured barely civil
exchanges between Democratic operatives decrying how restrictive legislation aims to
keep their constituents from the polls and Republican pundits scoffing at the allegation,
making their own case that such legislation protects the legitimacy of the electoral
process by combating fraud. Our findings confirm that Democrats are justified in their
concern that restrictive voter legislation takes aim along racial lines with strategic
partisan intent. But if that is the case, how do we interpret the President Obama’s
decisive victory in 2012? Some may read this as clear evidence that either reforms have
not suppressed voters or that voter suppression efforts did not work. This narrow focus on
the outcome in the presidential race both obscures the impacts of these policies and
misreads the extent to which the 2012 election represented a true test of the effects of
these laws.
Most importantly, many of the most onerous restrictive changes were not in effect
for the 2012 election.xc While we have focused above on the proposal and passage of
restrictive legislation, these developments have provoked a wide-ranging pushback in
defense of voter access. In 11 states laws were blocked, weakened, or postponed by
courts or the Department of Justice and in two states, Maine and Ohio, restrictive laws
were repealed by citizens.xci Further, the effects of some of these laws can be subtle,
difficult to discern, and most influential at the margins. For example, the results of a wide
range of studies indicate that most registered voters do possess the forms of identification
required by voter ID laws.xcii Consequently, such laws may do little to suppress routine
voters, but may serve to reduce participation among the eligible unregistered population
who are much more likely to lack basic forms of required identification. It has been
suggested that “[t]he real value of restrictive voter ID may be in what we might call
‘surge protection’ against the kind of mobilization of new, first-time voters who very
likely handed Obama his election [in 2008].”xciii Such effects may be consequential, but
are difficult to measure empirically.
That said, the impacts of other restrictive changes have been much less subtle.
Most infamously in Florida, one study estimates that roughly 200,000 voters were
discouraged from voting in the 2012 election due to long linesxciv and another study found
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that racial and ethnic minorities as well as Democrats were more likely to experience
significantly longer waits.xcv These long lines were, in part, a direct result of a reduction
in the number of early voting days passed by the Florida legislature in 2011. The
estimates from these studies in Florida alone underline the sobering reality of the
potential impact of these laws in the context of a tight election. Since the 2012 election,
thus far restrictive laws have been passed or proposed by Republicans in Arkansas,
Missouri, Montana, and Virginia. Republicans appear undeterred in their pursuit of these
restrictive policies and this most recent presidential defeat may only serve to galvanize
suppression efforts.
In addition, the Supreme Court recently decided to consider a constitutional
challenge to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 requires that states and
localities determined to have a history of undermining the franchise get preclearance
from the Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court in D.C. before enacting
electoral changes to ensure these alterations do not have an adverse effect on racial or
linguistic minorities. This is what allowed the Department of Justice to block or weaken
restrictive access legislation in states like Florida, Texas, and South Carolina in the runup to the 2012 election. Currently, in jurisdictions covered by Section 5 the burden of
proof lies on state or local governments to demonstrate that electoral changes do not have
a discriminatory or retrogressive impact on minorities before legislation goes into effect.
If overturned, challenges may still be brought but these suits will be a response to new
laws after they have been adopted and the burden of proof will lie with those bringing the
challenge. Further, final rulings could come after relevant elections. A central argument
made against the constitutionality of Section 5 is that it is outdated – covered states no
longer intend to discriminate or do so. Our findings call such assertions into question and,
more broadly, suggest that challenges to the implementation and passage of restrictive
access legislation are merited on the grounds of racial bias.
Why the Recent Intensification of Suppression Efforts?
Overall, we find strong empirical support for the position that recent legislative
efforts to restrict voter access are usefully conceptualized as yet another wave of election
reforms, in a long history for such reforms, pursued in order to demobilize and suppress
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particular categories of voters for partisan gain. But what is it about the current political
moment that has lead to the recent increase in the proposal and passage of legislation? A
widely acknowledged broad contextual factor is certainly the competitiveness of
presidential elections and the tight balance of congressional power in recent decades.
Tighter election margins incentivize not just voter suppression efforts, but a wide range
of tactics, including redistricting and legal challenges intended to shape election
outcomes.xcvi In the context of somewhat long-standing pressures to demobilize
Democratic opponents, why the efforts to reduce electoral access in the mid-to-late
2000s? The marriage of our findings and the voter suppression literature suggest
Republicans may have done so for a number of reasons: changing demographics; recent
Republican electoral losses; an unforgiving internal shift within the party to the
ideological right; and the party faithful’s response to vote fraud mythology.
Immediately following the 2012 election a specific narrative emerged
highlighting the manner in which the changing demographic composition of the United
States and the heavy skew of minority groups towards the Democrats both provided an
advantage for President Obama and potentially spelled trouble for the future prospects of
the GOP. Our findings regarding the influence of race and minority turnout suggest that
many Republicans were not unaware of these realities in the years preceding the 2012
election. This is understandable as the 2008 election was a particularly instructive
experience in this specific regard. The historic magnitude of Republican losses in the
2008 election are hard to overstate.xcvii Minority turnout and Democratic vote margins
among minority voters increased substantially in 2008 and this boost is widely viewed as
critical to Obama’s election.xcviii Republican upsets at the presidential level in the South,
(Florida, North Carolina and Virginia) were particularly painful and alarming to many
Republicans. “These three southern victories can be ascribed to two factors: unified bloc
voting by black voters combined with some crossover support by a minority of whites…
…the Obama-Biden ticket received almost unanimous support from black voters.”xcix
Given these realities, it has been argued that the accelerated proposal and passage
of restrictive election reforms represent a backlash against both the broader demographic
changes widely viewed as troublesome for Republicans and strong minority turnout and
support for the first non-white major party presidential nominee. Our findings are entirely
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consistent with such a backlash narrative or even that of a strategic elite-driven
“frontlash” in response to political setbacks as conceptualized by Velsa Weaver.c Weaver
describes a “frontlash” as:
“the process by which losers in a conflict become the architects of a new program,
manipulating the issue space and altering the dimension of conflict in an effort to
regain their command of the agenda. Frontlash hinges on the presence of winners
and losers of a recent political conflict…. …The dissatisfied parties seek openings
to mobilize a new issue, alter the dimensions of the conflict, or, in the
terminology of social movement theorists, “shift the locus of attack.”ci
In contrast to a traditional conception of a political backlash, exemplified perhaps in a
process where resentment among white voters with racial progress shapes electoral
outcomes, “[f]rontlash is preemptive, innovative, proactive, and, above all, strategic.”cii
Further, while the political momentum in backlash narratives are often a bottom-up
account focused on the behavior and preferences of dissatisfied voters from the bottom
up, a frontlash is conceptualized as an elite countermovement in response to some type of
political defeat. We consider this a useful conceptual frame for understanding the rise of
restrictive voter legislation, given the elite-driven nature of increased attention and policy
responses to the issue of voter fraud, and both the timing and strategic pattern of these
legislative efforts.
Also potentially at play in the recent GOP pursuit of restrictive legislation are the
unintended ramifications of the declining proportion and influence of moderates within
the party. As we have detailed, a voter suppression perspective argues that parties have an
incentive to suppress their opponents, as opposed to mobilizing new voters, when these
new voters bring demands or positions that conflict with their existing base of supporters.
In recent decades the Republican Party has both become more conservative on average
and more ideologically homogenous.ciii As Republicans in recent election cycles have
found themselves needing to increasingly move to the political right to win their
primaries, they have increasingly alienated particular groups of voters such as Latinos
and women. We suspect that when a party’s platform or rhetoric reduces the possibility
of building electoral coalitions and bringing in new voters, while representing the
interests of a demographically shrinking base, this alone increases the incentive to engage
in voter suppression. In a two party system, when mobilizing supporters is insufficient,
30

demobilizing opponents may provide the only route to victory. The increasing effort put
into voter suppression by the GOP in recent years may then be a reflection, in part, of
these internal ideological and practical constraints on mobilizing new voters.
Finally, the steady amplification of voter fraud mythology since the 2008 election
has undoubtedly contributed to the increased rate of restrictive legislative activity. The
historical deployment of fraud charges reminds that doing so is often a valuable political
tool for both explaining electoral losses and mobilizing supporters. Minnite goes as far as
to argue that the voter fraud myth has come to represent a “new Southern strategy” in
which the Republican base is “energized by the tarring of Democrats as cheaters and the
association of Democrats with a racialized crime-prone underclass.”civ For many
conservatives, fraud is now genuinely believed to play an influential role in American
political life. We find this unfortunate as such outsized concern will undoubtedly serve to
both justify and prompt continuing pressure for restrictive reforms while obscuring
attention to the very real problems that riddle our electoral institutions and practices.
Cumulative Voter Exclusion: Felon Disenfranchisement, Modern Poverty Governance, &
Restrictive Access Legislation
Our findings are deeply troubling in their own right. This is compounded by the
fact that we view this legislation as yet an additional layer of exclusionary policy
practices which work to reduce political participation and electoral access by the socially
marginalized. The manner in which these restrictions have unfolded bear a number of
similarities with modern developments in other policy arenas, especially criminal justice
policy and poverty governance.cv First, they are race, gender and class neutral on paper,
but have disparate political impacts in practice. Second, much of this exclusionary policy
action has occurred at the state-level where policymakers are less encumbered by federal
oversight. Third, the resulting variation in the accessibility to rights and benefits across
states is strongly shaped by considerations of race and social control. The net effect of
these policy regimes is to reduce, to varying degrees, full political incorporation among
the socially marginalized.
We have described recent legislative efforts to reduce electoral access, efforts that
have been pursued more aggressively in states with more minority voters. These
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developments rest on top of and interact with institutions and policies shaped by previous
struggles over who deserves access to the full benefits and rights of citizenship. Massive
increases in incarceration since the 1970s have combined with state-level variation in
felon disenfranchisement laws so that 1 in 13 African American men were ineligible to
vote in 2010 – compared to 1 in 40 of all Americans.cvi Differences in state
disenfranchisement laws produce a situation where disenfranchisement rates are the
highest in 7 Southern states and most potent in Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia where 1
in 5 African Americans legally cannot vote.cvii Felon disenfranchisement laws are an
enduring legacy of previous suppression efforts shaped directly by considerations of
racial impacts and social control. The increased punitiveness of the American criminal
justice system has dramatically increased the proportion of Americans currently
disenfranchised by this legacy, with African-Americans, the economically insecure, and
minorities disproportionately affected. This is the most direct of exclusionary policies
regarding access to the vote: legally limiting who is eligible to vote along racial and class
lines.
Electoral participation is also impacted by access to basic economic security and
support.cviii Since the mid-1990s Republicans have successfully led the charge, often with
Democratic complicacy, to dramatically decrease the receipt of means-tested social
welfare support while subjecting those who continue to receive support to harsh,
supervisory, and paternalistic policies.cix The centrality of states in crafting their poverty
policies under relatively weak federal guidelines has allowed for racial considerations
and social control to continue to define this new poverty governance.cx AfricanAmericans are more likely to live in states and localities that provide less generous
benefits and are more likely to be punitively sanctioned than their white counterparts in
the same state.cxi These disempowering policy experiences deplete political efficacy and
participation beyond the already lowered participatory expectations stemming from low
socio-economic status.cxii For our purposes, the negative impact on voting is most
important. Felony disenfranchisement means one cannot vote. For the socially
marginalized who can vote, existing poverty governance may undermine the political
efficacy to do so for many through direct policy learning in punitive programs and by
often failing to alleviate economic insecurity. As Joe Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford
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Schram argue, current poverty governance “deepens the political marginality of the poor,
channeling them into positions of civic inferiority and isolation.”cxiii
Viewed in the context of these intersecting policy developments, recent restrictive
voter access policies introduce still additional hurdles to those that already exist for
minorities, African-Americans, and lower-income citizens. In their current practice,
felony disenfranchisement, means-tested social welfare programs, and restrictive access
legislation make having the franchise, a welcoming path to accessing it, and the desire to
use it less likely for the poor and minorities in the United States. From this vantage,
recent passage of restrictive voter policies is an important prong in a broader suite of
policies expanding a form of conditional and exclusionary American citizenship.cxiv In
silent concert these policies work to undermine democratic voice for the most vulnerable.
The news then is not good for the inclusiveness of American democracy, but the
trend we have examined does not represent a foregone conclusion. The recent wave of
restrictive access legislation is rooted in long-standing racial and classist motivations
revived for modern deployment. While we consider our findings consistent with this
historical perspective on these developments, we also recognize the discursive and
political power of the voter fraud narrative and the effectiveness of those who have
vigorously purveyed this narrative. Simultaneously, the multifaceted political and legal
pushback that has emerged to counter recent efforts to reduce voter access underlines that
it is not only the advocates of restriction that have been exercising their political agency,
but also the supporters of inclusive voting rights.cxv As a result, the issue is currently a
matter of serious contestation. Supporters of voting rights can also take heart from the
fact that the Democratic party, as an enduring political institution (as opposed to a social
movement), has a strong and consistent electoral incentive to fight and attempt to reverse
recently enacted restrictive policies. On the other hand, given the internal dynamics
within the GOP and the current political landscape facing this party, we expect the
incentives to engage in suppression and other electoral manipulations to remain
heightened and to pose a continuing and significant threat to full electoral participation in
the years to comecxvi . The future of voting rights in the US will be determined by the
ongoing political contest between the Republican and Democratic parties. And at the
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same time, this contest itself will be influenced by the continuing political and legal
struggles over access to the ballot.
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Appendix A. Definitions and Data Sources
Variable

Definition

Source

Dependent Variables
Proposed Voter Restriction
Legislation

The number of restrictive changes to voter access in proposed legislation in each year.

National Conference of State Legislatures’s Database of Election Reform
Legislation 2006-2010 & The Brennan Center for Justice 2011

The number of restrictive changes to voter access in passed legislation in each year.

Ibid.

Average of % Republican in each chamber of the state
legislature*.

Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*

Republican Governor

Dummy variable indicating presence of Republican Governor.

Statistical Abstract of the U.S.

Divided State Government

Dummy variable indicating a state has a divided government.

Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*

Difference in Party Vote Share in
Previous Presidential Election

Difference in state vote share between the Republican and
Democratic parties in the previous presidential election.

Statistical Abstract of the U.S.

State Party Competition

A simplified version of the Ranney index containing only partisan
seat shares: 100 - (abs[(% Democrats in upper house) +
(% Democrats in lower house - 100])*

Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*

Voter Behavior & Suppression
Minority Turnout in Previous
Presidential Election

[{(citizen vote total by state) - (white citizen vote total by state)} / citizen vote total by state] * 100

U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and
Registration in the Election of November 2000, 2004, 2008

Change in Minority Turnout between
Previous Presidential Elections

minority turnout 2004 - minority turnout 2000
minority turnout 2008 - minority turnout 2004

U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and
Registration in the Election of November 2000, 2004, 2008

Class-biased Turnout in
Previous Presidential Election

% of upper class (individuals with family income over 75k) who voted in respective previous Presidential
United States Census Bureau's Current Population Survey,
election year / by the % of the lower class (individuals with family income under federal poverty line) who
Voter Supplement File for 2000, 2004, 2008
did so, multiplied by 100. Higher values indicate more upper-class bias (Avery and Peffley 2004: 53, 62).

Change in Class-biased Turnout
b/w Previous Presidential Elections

Class-bias turnout (CBT)2004 - CBT2000
CBT2008 - CBT2004

United States Census Bureau's Current Population Survey,
Voter Supplement File for 2000, 2004, 2008

Total State Turnout in
Previous Presidential Election

VEP (vote for highest office rates) in 2000, 2004, and 2008

Michael P. McDonald. 2012. "Presidential Voter Turnout Rates,
1948-2008. United States Elections Project. October 2011.

Perceptions of Voter Fraud
Reported Cases of Voter Fraud

Count of all allegations of voter fraud formally brought in the 2004 Election Cycle

Lorraine Minnite’s (2010: 159-200) complete description of voter fraud in 2004;
American Center for Voting Rights compiled the original allegations filed

% of ALEC-affiliated State
Legislators

Percentage of state legislators who either identify or have been identified as
members or affiliates of the American Legislative Exchange Council.

The Center for Media and Democracy’s ALEC
Exposed project

Liberal Citizen Ideology

Based on interest groups' ratings of Congresspersons and
their vote shares. See Berry et al. (1998) for details.

Berry et al. (1998) & Richard Fording

Demographic
% African-American

Number of African-Americans divided by total population

U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates

% Non-citizens

Number of non-citizens divided by total population

U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates

% Over 65

Number of state residents 65 years and older divided by total population

U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates

Passed Voter Restriction
Legislation
Independent Variables
Political Control & Competition
% of State Legislature Republican

Policy Diffusion

This variable is the total count of restrictive voter access legislation passed or proposed in contiguous
states in the previous year.
Previous Relevant Policy & Control Variables
Per capita Revenue
Total real state revenue divided by total population
(2008$)
Already Passed a Photo ID or Proof of
Citizenship Requirement

This variable takes a value of 1 if a state has already pass a photo identification or a proof of citizenship
requirement, and takes a value of 2 if a state has passed both.

U.S. Census Bureau

National Conference of State Legislatures

No-excuse and/or Early Voting currently If a state offers early voting this variable takes a value of 1, if the states offers early voting and no-excuse National Conference of State Legislatures
avaliable
absentee voting then this variable takes a value of 2.
*Except Nebraska

!
!

!

!

!

!
!

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!

!

Table 1: States Passing Voter Restriction Laws, 2006-2011!
Type of Law!
2006!
Photo ID
Missouri!
Required!

2007!
None!

Proof of
None!
Citizenship
Required!
Registration California,
Restrictions! Missouri,
Ohio,
Kentucky,
New
Hampshire!
Absentee & Alaska,
Early Voting Virginia!
Restrictions!

None!
North
Carolina
Florida!

Maine,
New
Mexico
(2)

2008!
2009!
2010!
2011!
None ! Oklahoma*! Idaho Alabama,
Kansas,
!
Mississippi
South
Carolina,
Tennessee,
Texas,
Wisconsin!
None! Georgia!
None! Alabama,
Kansas,
Tennessee!
None! None!
None! Florida,
Illinois,
Maine,
Ohio,
Texas (2),
Wisconsin!
None! Utah,
None! Florida,
Arkansas!
Georgia,
Ohio,
Tennessee
West
Virginia!
None ! None!
None! None!

Felon
None!
None!
Restrictions!
Shading indicates states where the Democratic Party held a majority of seats in
the state legislature in that year.
*Oklahoma voters may present a voter identification card (without a photo) in lieu
of a photo id. This is the only exception and most voters present photo id in
practice.

Table 2. GMM Analysis of Total Annual Proposed State Voter Restrictions: 2006-2011
Model 1
Partisan Control
% of State Legislature Republican
Instrument Variable
Divided State Government

Model 2

All Proposed
Legislation
1.356
1.148
(1.125)
(1.048)

Model 3
ID & Proof
of Citizenship
1.732
(1.955)

Model 4
Registration, Early, &
Absentee Restrictions
-0.138
(1.346)

0.128
(0.194)

0.166
(0.202)

0.281
(0.304)

0.283
(0.271)

State Party Competition

-0.008
(0.011)

-0.011
(0.010)

-0.013
(0.017)

0.004
(0.010)

Difference in Party Vote Share in
Previous Presidential Election

-0.009
(0.014)

-0.008
(0.013)

-0.010
(0.020)

-0.028*
(0.013)

5.37***
(1.12)

6.66***
(1.45)

1.41
(0.99)

Electoral Competition

Voter Behavior & Voter Suppression
Minority Turnout in Previous
Presidential Election
Change in Minority Turnout between
Previous Presidential Elections

0.130*** 0.103***
(0.032)
(0.029)

0.073
(0.045)

0.103**
(0.033)

Class-biased Turnout in
Previous Presidential Election

-0.005
(0.008)

-0.003
(0.007)

-0.000
(0.008)

-0.012*
(0.006)

Change in Class-biased Turnout
between Previous Presidential Elections

0.011**
(0.004)

0.011**
(0.004)

0.011*
(0.005)

0.014***
(0.004)

Total State Turnout in
Previous Presidential Election

0.001
(0.020)

0.007
(0.021)

0.001
(0.022)

-0.014
(0.023)

Demographic
% African American

4.46***
(1.08)

% Non-citizens

0.082**
(0.028)

0.072*
(0.029)

0.061^
(0.043)

0.095**
(0.023)

% Over 65

-0.039
(0.078)

-0.011
(0.076)

-0.059
(0.099)

-0.033
(0.080)

0.049
(0.037)

0.058
(0.041)

0.079^
(0.043)

0.006
(0.056)

0.099
(0.112)

0.119
(0.113)

-0.038
(0.218)

-0.028
(0.171)

Already Passed a Photo ID or
Proof of Citizenship Requirement

-1.237**
(0.371)

-1.142**
(0.351)

-2.364***
(0.564)

No-excuse Absentee and/or
Early voting currently avaliable

-0.187^
(0.106)

-0.231*
(0.107)

Per Capita State Revenue

-0.034
(0.044)

-0.039
(0.044)

Incidence & Perceptions of Electoral Fraud
Reported Cases of Voter Fraud

Policy Diffusion
Total passed similar legislation
in contiguous states (t-1)

Previous Relevant Policy & Control Variables

Constant

1.38
(2.97)
294

N

^p < .1 * p < .05

**p < .01 ***p < .001

0.52
(2.99)
294

-0.205
(0.152)
-0.069
(0.043)
0.40
(4.72)
294

-0.031
(0.043)
1.44
(2.75)
294

Table 3. Pooled Fixed Effects Poisson Analysis of Total
Annual Passed State Voter Restrictions: 2006-2011
Model 1

Model 2

Partisan Control
% of State Legislature Republican

15.08**
(5.34)

31.08***
(6.13)

Presense of Republican Governor

1.94**
(0.71)

2.58***
(0.71)

Divided State Government

-0.36
(2.09)

-0.069
(1.71)

State Party Competition

-0.061*
(0.024)

-0.057*
(0.028)

Difference in Party Vote Share in
Previous Presidential Election

-0.039
(0.067)

0.563*
(0.245)

Electoral Competition

Difference in Party Vote Share X % of
Legislature Republican

-1.069*
(0.419)

Voter Behavior & Voter Suppression
Minority Turnout in Previous
Presidential Election

92.68^
(52.94)

143.7**
(52.42)

Change in Minority Turnout between
Previous Presidential Elections

-0.215
(0.17)

-0.326
(0.267)

Class-biased Turnout in
Previous Presidential Election

0.048
(0.049)

0.085
(0.058)

Change in Class-biased Turnout
between Previous Presidential Elections

-0.013
(0.030)

-0.018
(0.030)

Total State Turnout in
Previous Presidential Election

-0.329^
(0.187)

-0.324^
(0.187)

% African American

145.9
(281.9)

382.8
(279.1)

% Non-citizens

2.04
(1.11)

2.61
(1.83)

% Over 65

-1.59
(1.00)

-2.48*
(0.97)

4.14
(5.99)

-2.74
(6.20)

-0.554
(0.342)

-0.662
(0.425)

Demographic

Perceptions of Electoral Fraud
% of ALEC-affiliated State
Legislators

Policy Diffusion
Total passed legislation
in contiguous states (t-1)

Previous Relevant Policy & Control Variables
Already Passed a Photo ID or
Proof of Citizenship Requirement

-3.50
(3.97)

-2.96
(2.28)

No-excuse Absentee and/or
Early voting currently avaliable

17.67***
(2.61)

16.38***
(2.57)

Per Capita State Revenue

17.67
(2.61)

-0.073
(0.225)

Log likelihood
N

^p < .1 * p < .05

-35.01
150

**p < .01 ***p < .001

-31.51
150

Table 4. Poisson Analysis of Count State Voter Restrictions
Passed in 2011
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Partisan Control
% of State Legislature Republican

-0.43
(1.98)

Precense of Republican Governor

1.98**
(0.71)

Divided State Government

-1.18
(0.91)

Unencumbered Republican Majority

2.69***
(0.72)

Electoral Competition
State Party Competition
Potential Swing State in 2010

7.29***
(1.72)

8.64***
(2.42)

0.016
(0.024)

0.017
(0.024)

0.005
(0.704)

-4.01**
(1.33)

Potential Swing State X Unencumbered
Republican Majority

4.54*
(2.28)

Voter Behavior & Voter Suppression
Minority Turnout in 2008 Presidential
Election

24.43***
(3.24)

Change in Minority Turnout between
Previous Presidential Elections

-0.418*
(0.184)

-0.05
-0.564*
(0.15)
(0.234)

Class-biased Turnout in
2008 Presidential Election

-0.025
(0.054)

-0.014
0.012
(0.013)
(0.041)

Change in Class-biased Turnout
between Previous Presidential Elections

0.041**
(0.015)

0.003
0.022
(0.013)
(0.015)

Total State Turnout in
2008 Presidential Election

-0.308*
(0.143)

-0.232*
(0.042)
(0.106)

Demographic
% African American

28.99***
(7.01)

% Non-citizens

-0.347*
(0.143)

-0.168
(0.106)

% Over 65

-0.198
(0.176)

-0.306*
(0.155)

Reported Cases of Voter Fraud

0.334*
(0.151)

0.329*
(0.144)

% of ALEC-affiliated State
Legislators

0.205
(5.19)

-0.692
(4.69)

Liberal Citizen Ideology

0.120^
(0.064)

0.097
(0.065)

Incidence & Perceptions of Electoral Fraud

Previous Relevant Policy & Control Variables
Already Passed a Photo ID or
Proof of Citizenship Requirement

-1.01^
(0.59)

-1.17^
(0.65)

-2.74***
(0.68)

-3.05***
(0.70)

No-excuse Absentee and/or
Early voting currently avaliable

-0.03
(0.23)

-0.05
(0.22)

2.49***
(0.70)

2.82**
(1.00)

Per Capita State Revenue

-0.41^
(0.23)

-0.38^
(0.20)

-0.83**
(0.25)

-0.23*
(0.20)

Constant

0.89
(2.27)
-35.48
49

Log likelihood
N

^p < .1 * p < .05

**p < .01 ***p < .001

0.79
(1.34)
-35.11
49

14.31
(13.81)
-22.21
49

1.36
(10.45)
-20.95
49

